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RESULTS & CONCLUSION

ABSTRACT
The research project, Feature Extraction and, Analysis of Binaries for Classification, provides
an in-depth examination of the features shared by unlabeled binary samples, for classification
into the categories of benign or malicious software using several different methods. Because
of the time it takes to manually analyze or reverse engineer binaries to determine their function, the ability to gather features and then instantly classify samples without explicitly programming the solution is incredibly valuable. It is possible to use an online service; however,
this is not always viable depending on the sensitivity of the binary. With Python3 and the Pefile library, we can gather the necessary features to begin choosing different classifier models
from the Scikit-learn library for machine learning. This all addresses the issue of local automated classification, and we present several different classifier models, datasets and methods
that allow for the classification of unknown binaries with a high degree of accuracy for predicting malware and benignware.

Many of the datasets utilized were heavily skewed towards malicious samples. For example,
one such dataset contained 28,393 malicious samples, while only containing 966 labeled benign samples. Due to this large imbalance we used undersampling. The data was adjusted prior to division into testing/training sets by taking min(m,b) samples from each class, where m is
the class of samples labeled to be malicious, and b is the class of samples labeled to be benign
in nature. In general, while this did improve the macro accuracy of several models, its primary
purpose was to improve the precision and recall scores of the benign class, as some models’
benign data was misclassified as malicious. To compare the effectiveness of undersampling at
redistributing the reliance of the models, we produced the following graphs:

BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the analysis of PE32 executables is done through the process of static or dynamic analysis. For static analysis this means using software like IDA or Radare2, interactive dissemblers and debuggers, to read the file and display the contents of their individual structures
without executing the program; whereas dynamic analysis requires the analyst to use a debugger or volatility tools to capture artifacts such as live memory, process trees, or file IO during
execution of the program. Each of these methods has its own benefits; however, only static
analysis was used for feature extraction for ease of use. Later results will demonstrate that
solely static analysis is needed for accurate classification.
One way to simplify this format structure is with the following breakdown of a PE32 file,
which shows what kind of information can be used:

Random Forest feature ranking w/o undersampling

Adaboost feature ranking w/ undersampling

Here it can be seen how imbalanced the models we created were before undersampling the dataset. By evening the samples chosen from both classes, the models we employed were more
resilient against inconsistencies of heavily relied upon features like AddressOfEntryPoint.
The following graph was an attempt to demonstrate an attribution of different families of
backdoor malware samples, by creating one node for each sample and edges between those
nodes, representing a relationship between the two nodes. In this instance, the relationships
were determined by scoring the jaccard distance similarities, with a threshold of 0.8, of the extracted import strings, although the clusters are convoluted and could have been represented
better with a technique that weighs the edges between nodes like, KMeans with ChineseWhispers clustering. The main takeaway is that anomalous samples with fewer common relations
are shown grouped at an equal distance from the center.

Any of the extracted information is meaningless without a person to study the contents, which
is why machine learning methods are implemented. Machine learning is, in essence, the practice of getting computers to act without being explicitly programmed to make those decisions
or actions. Classification is a type of machine learning that uses given data points to predict
the class called labels or categories. These predictive models are used to approximate a mapping function from input variables to discrete output variables. They are evaluated using different methods like: precision and recall, receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve, f1
score, or even k-fold validation. By applying these mathematical concepts to malware identification, we can express the relationships between samples as binary classifiers, such as benign
The following chart shows the overall performance evaluation for the models used:

METHODOLOGY
While several different datasets were used over the course of the project, the final results were
calculated using a combination of binaries taken from Hybrid Analysis and from VirusShare.
The binaries taken from Hybrid Analysis were obtained via the associated API, and were composed of samples that were previously analyzed for users and determined to be malicious and
benign. As a form of preprocessing - all samples gathered were verified as PE32 format executable by examining the magic bytes field, the first two bytes of an executable binary, as
’MZ’. Once binaries were obtained, a Python script was utilized to extract a variety of features.
To obtain workable data from these binaries, we created a Python script using the Pefile Python3 library to extract a wealth of features. By feeding each sample as a buffered input we
can further parse each section using the same structured format. This includes the size of the
imports directory, the sum of imports from all imported DLLs, as well as the imports’ ordinals. Similarly, the extraction of any features from the PE32 samples follows the format of
calling the Pefile function ‘pe’ with the appropriate class identifier for the requested field.
The following are the specific properties extracted from the PE header for training:
Name

MD5

Machine

SizeOfOptionalHeader

Characterisitcs

MajorLinkerVersion

MinorLinkerVersion

SizeOfCode

SizeOfInitializedData

SizeOfUninitializedData

AddressOfEntryPoint

BaseOfCode

BaseOfData

ImageBase

SectionAlignment

FileAlignment

MajorOperatingSystemVersion

MinorOperatingSystemVersion

SizeOfImage

SizeOfHeaders

Checksum

Subsystem

DllCharacteristics

SizeOfStackReserve

SizeOfStackCommit

SizeOfHeapReserve

SizeOfHeapCommit

LoaderFlags

NumberOfRvaAndSizes

SectionsNb

SectionsMeanEntropy

SectionsMinEntropy

SectionsMaxEntropy

SectionsMeanRawsize

SectionsMeanVirtualsize SectionsMinVirtualsize

SectionsMaxVirtualsize

ImportsNbDLL

ImportsNb

ImportsNbOrdinal

ExportNb

ResourcesNb

ResourcesMeanEntropy

ResourcesMinEntropy

ResourcesMaxEntropy

ResourcesMeanSize

ResourcesMinSize

ResourcesMaxSize

LoadConfigurationSize

VersionInformationSize

Benign

Models used were tuned and parameterized using the default guidelines given by Scikit-learn,
an open source machine learning library that supports supervised and unsupervised learning. It
also provides various tools for model fitting, data preprocessing, model selection and evaluation, and many other utilities.

In conclusion, the research demonstrates that the combination of static analysis, for feature extraction, with basic supervised machine learning methods is able to achieve a macro accuracy.

FUTURE WORK
The majority of this research, however, was hindered by the lack of verifiable benign
(negative) software samples. Given the focus for analysis and identification of malware
(positive), that difference in availability is almost incomparable because the lack of data is insufficient to correctly form the right bias when training models; this is often referred to as
overfitting and underfitting, and there are many methods to combat this issue.
One example would be to use Positive Unlabeled (PU) learning. Given a set of samples of a
particular class P, called the positive class, and a set of unlabeled samples U, which contains
both class P and non-class P, called the negative class instances, the goal is to build a binary
classifier to classify the test set T into two classes, positive and negative, where T can be U. In
this case though, the positive examples are malicious and the set of unlabeled samples can
contain both malicious and benign samples. This would allow future research to be completed
without the limits caused by a lack of verified, benign samples previously needed by models
like, random forest or logistic regression with undersampling.

